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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
1
 
Amici are law professors with expertise in interna-
tional, extraterritorial, and privacy law. We share an in-
terest in the proper understanding of the Charming 
Betsy canon of construction and the law of extraterrito-
riality. We submit this brief to clarify how these doctrines 
should be applied in this case, and to explain how each 
independently bars interpreting the Stored Communica-
tions Act (SCA) to allow seizure of electronic data from 
inside Ireland’s sovereign territory. We also wish to high-
light certain flaws in the analysis the Government offers 
in this case, which fails to account for Charming Betsy, 
and espouses too narrow a view of the SCA’s focus, in its 
effort to escape the Act’s acknowledged territorial 
boundaries and authorize plainly extraterritorial con-
duct.  
Biographical information for each signatory to this 
brief is provided in the appendix. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Both the Charming Betsy canon and the law of extra-
territoriality fit within a well-defined body of law this 
Court has developed for determining how American law 
applies abroad. These doctrines exist independently: one 
aims to avoid unsanctioned violations of international 
law. The other prevents the improper projection of 
                                            
1 Petitioner and respondent have both lodged blanket amicus 
consent letters with the Court. No counsel for any party authored 
this brief in whole or in part, and no entity other than amici or their 
counsel made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submis-
sion of this brief. 
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American legal power beyond our borders. But they 
share much in common. Both rest on a properly re-
strained understanding of the judiciary’s proper place in 
our constitutional order, under which the often-delicate 
issues of foreign affairs in lawmaking are properly re-
served to Congress, not courts. And both are grounded 
on shared insights the Court has gained over time about 
Congress’s approach to lawmaking: Its preference for 
“domestic, not foreign matters,” Morrison v. Nat’l Aus-
tralia Bank, 561 U.S. 247, 254 (2010); its respect for oth-
er nations’ sovereignty; its regard for international law; 
its inclination toward international collaboration; and 
perhaps most importantly of all, its avoidance of interna-
tional friction and strife—unless some overriding policy 
need compels congressional action despite the risk of 
such strife.  
Yet the Government urges a departure from both the 
letter and spirit of these doctrines in its interpretation of 
the Stored Communications Act (SCA), 18 U.S.C. § 2701 
et seq. The Government claims the SCA’s warrant provi-
sion conveys to it the power to seize private email com-
munications, likely belonging to Irish citizens, housed in 
an Irish data center, without Ireland’s consent or cooper-
ation. And the Government contends that it shares this 
international seizure power with state and local law en-
forcement officials. This based on a statute the Govern-
ment admits has no extraterritorial reach, utilizing elec-
tronic storage and retrieval mechanisms that Congress 
could hardly have conceived of, let alone authorized, 
when the SCA was enacted.  
The Government claims this is possible because, in its 
view, these electronic incursions into foreign sovereign 
territory simply do not count in the extraterritoriality 
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analysis. As the Government sees it, the focus of the 
Act’s warrant provision is limited to the “disclosure” that 
occurs when Microsoft employees retrieve the data from 
a computer terminal at Microsoft’s corporate headquar-
ters in Redmond, Washington, and turn it over to law en-
forcement. Gov’t Br. 21–23. But this position cannot be 
squared with the doctrines developed in the Court’s 
precedents.  
The first problem with the Government’s theory is 
that—irrespective of the SCA’s extraterritorial reach—
the electronic seizure of electronic records physically lo-
cated in another country is an exercise of extraterritorial 
enforcement jurisdiction. That is a plain violation of in-
ternational law, no different than if FBI agents set foot 
on Irish soil to retrieve the data themselves. Under the 
Charming Betsy canon, first enumerated by Chief Jus-
tice Marshall in Murray v. The Schooner Charming 
Betsy, U.S. courts are constrained to avoid interpreting 
“an act of congress” in a manner that would “violate the 
law of nations, if any other possible construction re-
mains,” 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)—whether the 
statute at issue is meant to apply extraterritorially or 
not. Congress gave no hint in the SCA that it intended 
for warrants under Section 2703 to authorize violations 
of international law, and the Government provides no 
reason to believe these violations can be ignored. Appli-
cation of the Charming Betsy canon thus requires find-
ing that the Government’s requested power to seize elec-
tronic records from Ireland exceeds the authority con-
veyed under the SCA.  
The Government’s theory also has problems under 
the law of extraterritoriality itself. Even if the ambit of 
Section 2703’s focus were limited to “disclosure”—a point 
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that Microsoft persuasively rebuts—that focus would 
still incorporate the use of Section 2703 warrants to 
compel electronic retrieval of data located in other coun-
tries. Section 2703’s text may speak only of “disclosure,” 
but the power it conveys extends beyond the page, au-
thorizing law-enforcement officials to compel providers 
to perform an entire sequence of steps needed to effec-
tuate disclosure. That whole range of authorized conduct 
necessarily lies within the Act’s focus, and was the sub-
ject of Congress’s legitimate concern in crafting it. Ac-
cordingly, if law-enforcement officials wish to use Section 
2703 warrants to compel disclosure of emails stored in 
other countries, they need express authorization from 
Congress to do so, which all agree Congress has not pro-
vided. The correct result then is to reject the Govern-
ment’s position in this case. 
That result is also necessary to remain faithful to this 
Court’s precedents and the principles behind its extra-
territoriality doctrine. The U.S.’s aggressive stance on 
compelled disclosure of information stored abroad has 
already created pronounced friction with other countries. 
A Government win here would further stoke those re-
sentments—and could realistically provoke retaliation—
at a time when Congress has indicated a preference for 
détente and international cooperation through treaties. 
Much remains to be developed in this area of the law to 
promote legitimate law enforcement needs, to address 
our sovereign neighbors’ security concerns, and to pro-
tect our citizens’ liberty and security. But only Congress 
is properly equipped to deal with these sensitive issues. 
That prerogative should not be handed over to judges or 
federal law enforcement—and certainly should not be 
enjoyed by the state and local law enforcement officials 
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who are also empowered to use the SCA’s warrant provi-
sions. 
Rejecting the Government’s position is likewise es-
sential to preserve assumptions about extraterritoriality 
that the legislative and judicial branches have shared 
since the Republic’s early days. These shared assump-
tions properly constrain law enforcement and other gov-
ernmental actors. They also prevent the march of tech-
nological progress from introducing an extraterritorial 
creep into laws that Congress intended to remain domes-
tically fixed. 
This is not to say that U.S. enforcement powers 
should never reach into a foreign country. It may be that 
borderless law enforcement is necessary for combatting 
terrorism or certain types of transnational crimes. There 
may be situations when no international treaty exists, 
where bilateral cooperation is impossible, or where re-
mote cross-border searches are necessary to prevent 
criminal evasion. But none of those circumstances exist 
here. And even if they did, a proper regard for the sepa-
ration of powers—and the branches’ respective institu-
tional competences—demands that Congress be the one 
to make those calls. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The SCA does not authorize law-enforcement 
officers to violate international law by seizing 
electronic data physically stored in another 
country. 
Because the Government agrees that the SCA per-
mits no extraterritorial application, the Government’s 
case begins and ends with an examination of Section 
2703’s “focus,” the “second step” required in an extrater-
6 
ritoriality analysis. Gov’t Br. 17; see also RJR Nabisco, 
Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2100 (2016). Yet 
there is another canon of statutory construction that the 
Government entirely neglects—and that resolves this 
case: the Charming Betsy canon, which imposes inde-
pendent limits on Section 2703’s reach. That canon pro-
hibits interpreting U.S. statutes in a manner that would 
violate international law unless Congress has authorized 
the violation in the statute itself. And just such an un-
sanctioned international-law violation would occur if law-
enforcement officers used Section 2703 warrants to seize 
data physically stored in other countries. 
A. International law prohibits unilateral execution 
of a warrant inside another country’s sovereign 
territory. 
Because a country’s authority within its boundaries is 
“exclusive and absolute,” The Schooner Exchange v. 
McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116, 136 (1812), “[t]he first and fore-
most restriction imposed by international law on a State 
is *** [that] it may not exercise its power in any form in 
the territory of another State.” PCIJ, SS Lotus (France 
v Turkey), PCIJ Reports, Series A, No. 10, p. 19 (1927). 
This restriction walls-in law-enforcement officials, pro-
hibiting them from “exercise[ing] their functions in the 
territory of another state” without “the consent of the 
other state.” Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Rela-
tions Law of the United States § 432; id. cmt. b. B. Law 
enforcement is an exercise of “enforcement jurisdic-
tion”—the “most intrusive of jurisdictional claims.” Rob-
ert Cryer et al., An Introduction to International Crim-
inal Law and Procedure 44 (2d ed. 2010). And going 
back to the Founding, it has been considered a funda-
mentally local activity. McKenna v. Fisk, 12 U.S. 241, 248 
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(1843) (“‘Crimes are in their nature, local, the jurisdic-
tion of crimes is local,’” quoting Rafael v. Verelst, 1058 2 
W. Bl. (1055)). 
Execution of a warrant in another country without its 
consent is a paradigmatic exercise of enforcement juris-
diction, and a plain violation of international law. In re 
Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Africa, 552 
F.3d 157, 171 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting that warrants lack 
extraterritorial reach); see also Jennifer Daskal, The Un-
Territoriality of Data, 125 Yale L.J. 326, 354 (2015) 
(“The overarching rule is that the judiciary’s warrant 
authority is territorially limited.”) (citing authorities).  
This Court has recognized this territorial limit on 
warrant enforcement in its constitutional jurisprudence. 
See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 
279 (1990) (noting that a “warrant” is a “dead letter out-
side of the United States”). And Congress likewise ob-
serves this limit in lawmaking—as the SCA itself demon-
strates. The SCA prohibits foreign governments from 
enforcing their own warrants to obtain data in the Unit-
ed States, through its refusal to list turnover to foreign 
governments among the disclosures permitted under 
Section 2702. It likewise bans foreign governments from 
obtaining a warrant in this country to obtain data locat-
ed here. The SCA excludes foreign governments from 
the list of “governmental entities” entitled to apply for a 
Section 2703 warrant. And that ban is subject to only one 
narrow exception—provided in the Foreign Evidence 
Request Efficiency Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3512 et seq.—which 
still offers no direct route to obtaining a U.S. warrant. It 
instead requires that he foreign government ask the De-
partment of Justice to obtain a Section 2703 warrant on 
its behalf, 18 U.S.C. § 3512 (a)(1) & (a)(2)(B), ensuring 
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that any foreign law-enforcement operations conducted 
in this country will be subject to strict Department su-
pervision. 
 The Government cannot sidestep these universally 
recognized dictates of international law simply by con-
scripting Microsoft to conduct the retrieval on its behalf. 
Where a private party conducts a seizure “by compulsion 
of sovereign authority,” that seizure is “attributable to 
the Government.” Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ 
Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 614–615 (1989); see also United Na-
tions General Assembly, Resolution 56/83, Annex, art. 5, 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts (2001) (“The conduct of a person or entity which is 
not an organ of the State *** but is empowered by law 
*** to exercise elements of the governmental authority 
shall be considered an act of the State under internation-
al law.”). 
The fact that retrieval would be initiated electronical-
ly from inside the United States, at Microsoft’s Red-
mond, Washington corporate headquarters, without 
travel to Ireland, also does not change the seizure’s fun-
damentally international character. Such remote elec-
tronic retrieval efforts would still be “directed towards 
consummation, and require compliance” in Ireland, even 
if they were “initiated” in the U.S., and thus raise the 
same “problem of enforcement jurisdiction” as “when a 
State acts in foreign territory itself.” FTC v. Compagnie 
de Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1316 
n.89 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting Mann, The Doctrine of Ju-
risdiction in International Law, 1 Rec. Des Cours 1, 128 
(1964)). At bottom, using a computer in Washington to 
retrieve emails from Ireland is a projection of American 
enforcement power abroad—one reaching physically into 
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the sovereign territory of another country to seize pri-
vate property, the same as when foreign countries like 
Russia illicitly access American computer networks from 
outside the United States to steal our citizens’ personal 
information. 
Indeed, the Government’s dismissal of data’s physical 
location as a peripheral concern in seizures is a depar-
ture from its own established position. In the Depart-
ment of Justice’s manual on computer searches and elec-
tronic surveillance, the Department almost seems to 
channel Microsoft when it advises that the location 
“where the remotely stored data is located” is the key 
consideration for determining the proper means to ac-
cess it lawfully. Office of Legal Education Executive Of-
fice for United States Attorneys, Searching and Seizing 
Computers and Obtaining Electronic Evidence in Crim-
inal Investigations 84 (2009) (DOJ Manual). The DOJ 
Manual cautions that when the data is stored outside the 
United States, “the United States may be required to 
take actions ranging from informal notice to a formal re-
quest for assistance to the country concerned,” id. at 85, 
usually using methods provided under the sorts of mutu-
al legal assistance treaties (MLATs)—like the one the 
U.S. has with Ireland—that Government now derides as 
ineffectual, antiquated, and irrelevant, Gov’t Br. 44–45. 
The DOJ Manual elsewhere explains the need for this 
cautious, consent-based approach, explaining that “in 
general, law enforcement officers exercise their func-
tions in the territory of another country only with the 
consent of that country,” so unilateral action would be 
improper. DOJ Manual 56–57. The Department itself 
thus agrees that non-consensual searches of data located 
in another country are a violation of international law. 
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B. Under the Charming Betsy canon, the SCA’s 
silence on these violations of international law 
means Congress has not authorized them. 
These principles of international law are not inviolate. 
Congress “clearly has constitutional authority” to exceed 
these “customary international-law limits,” Hartford 
Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 815 (1993) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting), and sanction international exer-
cises of enforcement jurisdiction—if it so desires. But the 
Court operates on the principle that “legislators take ac-
count of the legitimate sovereign interests of other na-
tions when they write American laws,” and thus “ordi-
narily seek[] to follow” these “principles of customary 
international law,” F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Em-
pagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004). The Court there-
fore follows the prudent course, first charted in Charm-
ing Betsy, that courts should look for some “‘affirmative 
intention of the Congress clearly expressed’” before al-
lowing violations of international law. McCulloch v. So-
ciedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 
10, 21–22 (1963) (quoting Benz v. Compania Naviera Hi-
dalgo, 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957)). The Court also con-
strues ambiguous statutes “to avoid unreasonable inter-
ference with the sovereign authority of other nations.” 
Empagran, 542 U.S. at 164.  
Charming Betsy’s “practice of using international 
law to limit the extraterritorial reach of statutes is firmly 
established in our jurisprudence,” Hartford Fire, 509 
U.S. at 817 (Scalia, J., dissenting). And it is “‘wholly in-
dependent’ of the presumption against extraterritoriali-
ty,” id. at 815 (quoting EEOC v. Arabian American Oil 
Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 246, 264 (1991), applying even “if 
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the presumption against extraterritoriality has been 
overcome or is otherwise inapplicable, id. at 814. 
Like the presumption against extraterritoriality, the 
Charming Betsy canon is fundamentally about preserv-
ing the proper balance of judicial and legislative func-
tions. Courts have no place entering the “‘delicate field of 
international relations” absent Congress’s express per-
mission. McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 21–22 (quoting Benz, 353 
U.S. at 147). 
Nothing in Section 2703—or anywhere else in the 
SCA—provides the clear expression of congressional will 
required to permit violations of international law. That 
can only mean Congress has not authorized them. Ac-
cordingly, regardless of the SCA’s “focus” under extra-
territoriality law, the Charming Betsy canon inde-
pendently blocks the illegal exercise of enforcement ju-
risdiction the Government seeks to authorize in this case. 
C. The Government’s position is irreconcilable with 
our international legal obligations and 
Charming Betsy. 
The Government never mentions Charming Betsy by 
name, even to distinguish it. And it makes no attempt to 
dispute any of these bedrock principles of international 
law. Instead, it tries various ways of minimizing the obvi-
ous clash between its position on unilateral cross-border 
searches and these principles of international law and 




1. No international treaty permits unilat-
eral trans-state seizure of private electron-
ic data. 
The closest the Government comes to acknowledging 
its obligations under international law is its reference the 
Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime Nov. 23, 
2001, S. Treaty Doc. No. 11, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (2003), 
2296 U.N.T.S. 167 (the Budapest Convention), to which 
the U.S. and Ireland are both signatories. The Govern-
ment asserts that the Budapest Convention obliges the 
U.S. to adopt legislation allowing it to unilaterally seize 
data located in other countries through production or-
ders aimed at U.S.-based service providers. Then it 
points to the absence of any implementing legislation en-
acted after the treaty’s ratification as a sign that Con-
gress believed the SCA to already contain that requisite 
authority. Gov’t Br. 47–49. 
a. The Convention simply does not do what the Gov-
ernment suggests. The Government contends that the 
authority for unilateral cross-border searches stems 
from the Convention’s Article 18.1(a), Gov’t Br. 48, which 
allows signatory countries to make provisions for “pro-
duction order[s]” that their law-enforcement officials 
may use to compel a person located in the party’s terri-
tory to turn over data within that person’s “possession or 
control.” But nothing in Article 18.1(a) expressly author-
izes use of production orders issued in one country to ac-
cess private data stored in another country, even if within 
the “possession or control” of a person located in the par-
ty’s territory.  
That dooms the Government’s argument. Treaties 
like the Convention must be “interpreted against the 
background of the general principles of international 
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law.” Baron Arnold Duncan McNair, The Law of Treaties 
466 (2d ed. 1961); see also Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31.3(c), 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 (requiring that “[a]ny relevant rules of in-
ternational law applicable in the relations between the 
parties” be taken into account in interpreting treaties). 
Those background legal principles strictly prohibit uni-
lateral cross-border seizures. And those restrictions re-
main in force because they have not been overridden by 
Article 18’s “express terms.” Joost Pauwelyn, The Rule 
of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can 
We Go?, 95 Am. J. Int’l L. 535, 541 (2001) (quoting 
George Pinson (Fr.) v. United Mexican States, 5 R.I.A.A. 
327 (422 Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928)). Interpreting Article 
18.1(a) to allow unilateral cross-border data seizures 
would thus be inconsistent with both the Convention’s 
unambiguous terms and universally accepted principles 
of treaty interpretation. 
b. Interpreting Article 18.1(a) to allow production or-
ders to reach data stored in other countries would also be 
inconsistent with the Convention’s Article 32. That pro-
vision, entitled “Trans-border access to stored data,” 
makes clear that the Convention leaves in place virtually 
all preexisting domestic laws regarding warrant en-
forcement, and has virtually no effect on parties’ obliga-
tions under international prohibiting unilateral cross-
border data seizures. Article 32 provides that unless a 
party obtains the authorization of another party, it may 
only access data stored in another country if that data is 
“publicly available,” or the party obtains the “lawful and 
voluntary consent” of a person with the “lawful authority 
to disclose the data”—normally only the data’s owner. If 
the data stored in another country is privately kept, and 
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the searching party does not obtain consent, Article 32 
provides no avenue to unilaterally access it. And the re-
mainder of the Convention does not either. These strict 
restrictions that permit access to data stored abroad in 
only exceptionally narrow circumstances—no matter 
what means of access are employed—cannot be recon-
ciled with the Government’s broad view of Article 18, 
which would allow law-enforcement personnel virtually 
unimpeded access to data stored in other countries simp-
ly because that access is obtained through a production 
order. 
Article 32’s strict restrictions on cross-border sei-
zures exist because the Convention’s parties could not 
reach mutually acceptable terms allowing for anything 
more. As the Convention’s Explanatory Report explains, 
the issue “of when a Party is permitted to unilaterally 
access computer data stored in another Party without 
seeking mutual assistance” was “discussed at length” at 
the convention. Convention on Cybercrime Explanatory 
Report ¶293 (Nov. 23, 2001). But the drafters “ultimately 
determined that it was not yet possible to prepare a 
comprehensive, legally binding regime regulating this 
area.” Ibid. The Government’s interpretation of the Con-
vention thus requires inserting terms into the treaty 
concerning matters on which the parties were explicitly 
unable to reach consensus.  
c. It is thus perhaps unsurprising that the Govern-
ment’s only supporting authority comes from a snippet 
culled from a Guidance Note that was drafted separately 
from the Convention itself. Gov’t Br. 49 (citing Cyber-
crime Convention Committee, Council of Europe, T-CY 
Guidance Note #10 (Mar. 1, 2017) (Guidance Note)). 
Less surprising still is that this slender reed proves in-
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adequate to the task. The document, which declares itself 
to be “not binding,” Guidance Note art. 1, provides that 
production orders may be used to uncover “subscriber 
information” located in other countries. But this refer-
ence to “subscriber information” does not implicate Arti-
cle 18.1(a), upon which the Government relies. Instead, 
its reference to “subscriber information” dovetails with 
the terms of Article 18.1(b), on which the Government 
does not rely. This is because Article 18.1(b) envisions a 
different sort of situation, in which a service provider is 
“offering its services in the territory of the Party,” ibid., 
but is not “necessarily located in the territory,” Guidance 
Note art. 1—for instance, if Microsoft’s headquarters 
were located in Ireland but the company still served the 
U.S. market. In such circumstances, Article 18.1(b) al-
lows law enforcement officials to obtain “subscriber in-
formation” even if it requires obtaining it from the pro-
vider’s home country. Budapest Convention art. 18.1(b). 
Article 18.1(b)’s promise of access to “subscriber da-
ta” is also a far cry from the right of untrammeled cross-
border access to non-U.S. citizens’ private emails that 
the Government claims. If the Government were to de-
mand that a party turn over “subscriber information,” as 
that term is defined under Article 18.3 of the Convention, 
it would receive only details about the subscriber’s iden-
tity, such as her name and address, along with her means 
of electronic access and the services she consumes. It 
would not be entitled to obtain the private contents of 
email communications—because “subscriber infor-
mation” is defined to exclude any such “traffic or content 
data,” which remains private. Budapest Convention art. 
18.3. This is consistent with the idea from Article 32 that 
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such private data is largely shielded from unilateral 
cross-border access.  
As for Article 18.1(a), the Guidance Note envisions 
that this provision will allow law-enforcement officers to 
compel a person to disclose his or her own information, 
not private information belonging to third parties. This is 
confirmed by the Explanatory Report, which anticipates 
that a production order issued under Article 18.1(a) 
would be used to seize “information stored in his or her 
[own] account,” not the information in some third-party’s 
account. Explanatory Report ¶173. 
The Government’s expansive interpretation is also at 
war with other provisions within the Guidance Note. The 
Guidance Note makes clear that production orders al-
lowed under Article 18 are purely “domestic” in charac-
ter—“to be provided for under domestic criminal law.” 
Guidance Note art. 3.4. And the power to issue these or-
ders is “constrained by the adjudicative and enforcement 
jurisdiction of the Party in which the order is granted.” 
Ibid. Indeed, the Guidance Note contains a savings 
clause providing that agreement to the Guidance Note 
would not constitute “consent to the extraterritorial ser-
vice or enforcement of a domestic production order is-
sued by another State.” Id. art. 3.3.2  
                                            
2 The Government will argue that the Guidance Note’s reference 
to “extraterritorial service or enforcement” is meant to address cir-
cumstances in which one party—the issuer of a production order—
seeks to force another party—the one in whose territory the data is 
located—to seize the data on the issuing party’s behalf. But it is un-
likely that the Guidance Note would devote time to explicitly ad-
dressing such rarely occurring circumstances. The better view is 
that this passage speaks precisely to the issue in this case—namely, 
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Further still, the Guidance Note confirms that Article 
18.1 was meant to overcome corporate legal barriers, not 
geographic ones. It clarifies that “[t]he term ‘possession 
or control’ refers to [both] physical possession of the data 
concerned in the ordering Party’s territory,” and situa-
tions involving “constructive possession,” such as when 
the data is housed by some “remote online storage ser-
vice.” Guidance Note ¶173. 
Taken together, these provisions in the Guidance con-
firm that international law’s territorial limits on seizures 
survived the Convention. Geographically speaking, war-
rants extend no further after the Convention than they 
did before. And if parties wish to authorize unilateral 
trans-state seizures of data, they must instead look out-
side the Convention—to some law extending enforce-
ment of production orders into other countries, or some 
other treaty by which countries have mutually agreed to 
allow the unilateral enforcement of production orders 
among themselves. While the Guidance raises the ab-
stract possibility that a production order might issue to 
allow a party to recover data stored overseas, it is clear 
in context that such unilateral access can only occur if 
the party’s law already allowed for it.   
The Government’s reliance on the Guidance Note also 
requires a series of unsustainable chronological and in-
ferential leaps. Nothing indicates that this document, 
written in 2017, actually captured any signatory’s under-
standing of the Convention when it was enacted more 
                                                                                          
a party’s effort to enforce a domestic production order extraterrito-
rially on its own, by ordering production of third-party data stored 
abroad through remote access.  
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than a decade and a half before in 2001—much less what 
Congress meant still a decade and a half before then, 
when it enacted the SCA in 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, tit. 
II, 100 Stat. 1860 (Oct. 21, 1986). More fundamentally, 
these stacked inferences of implied congressional intent 
lack the express clarity that Charming Betsy and the law 
of extraterritoriality each require before Congress can 
be understood to have authorized extraterritorial en-
forcement or sanctioned violations of international law. 
d. The Government’s view of Article 18’s reach is also 
difficult to square with the Convention’s larger goals, 
which aim to promote cooperation on remote searches 
through MLAT procedures. The Convention broadly 
adopts an approach that limits searches to data located 
in the party’s home country as outlined in Article 19—
which only provides for authorities to access data “stored 
in its territory.” Article 32 anticipates that when the data 
is stored in another country, the best route to obtaining it 
will normally lie through that other party’s “consent”—
clearly anticipating the existence of an MLAT. This con-
sensus-based framework throws the legal barriers im-
posed by international law on cross-border searches into 
high relief. The Government’s go-it-alone read of the 
Convention, by contrast, goes against its consensus-
emphasizing grain, and renders the Convention’s provi-
sions anticipating party consent—and their implicit ref-
erences to MLATs—entirely irrelevant. Accordingly, the 
Convention’s text and context both confirm that the 
Convention never meant to authorize unilateral cross-
border searches, and does not reflect any understanding 
that the SCA does so either. 
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2. The Government’s analogy to civil sub-
poenas fails. 
Equally flawed is the Government’s attempt to close 
the distance between its position and the dictates of in-
ternational law by analogizing Section 2703 warrants to 
civil subpoenas of a company’s own business records. 
The Government points to lower court decisions author-
izing use of these subpoenas to compel collection of in-
formation stored abroad, Gov’t Br. 14, 32–34, calling this 
the “backdrop” against which the SCA was enacted, id. 
at 32. But the subpoena analogy is a bad one for the Gov-
ernment, as it only highlights the perils of the Govern-
ment’s neglect of the Charming Betsy canon by illustrat-
ing how lower courts have neglected it too. 
Subpoenas ordering parties to produce documents or 
data physically located in other countries may not gener-
ally be considered exercises of extraterritorial enforce-
ment jurisdiction, as they are usually issued at the be-
hest of private parties, not government officials. But 
they are nonetheless viewed by virtually every other 
country as a violation of national sovereignty. Interna-
tional Law Association, Report of the Fifty-First Confer-
ence 407 (1965) (“It is difficult to find any authority un-
der international law for the issuance of orders compel-
ling the production of documents from abroad. The doc-
uments are admittedly located in the territory of another 
state.”). They are also likely a violation of the interna-
tional legal principle of nonintervention, which prohibits 
all acts intended “to coerce another State in order to ob-
tain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sover-
eign rights and to secure from it advantages of any 
kind.” United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution 
2625 (XXV), annex, Declaration on Principles of Inter-
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national Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nations (Oct. 24, 1970).  
Even if judicially sanctioned international incursions 
via subpoena were not violations of international law, 
they would still offend “comity”—“the respect sovereign 
nations afford each other by limiting the reach of their 
laws.” Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 817 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing). “That comity is exercised by legislatures when they 
enact laws,” and courts likewise “assume it has been ex-
ercised” when executing their judicial functions. Ibid. 
(citing J. Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws § 
38 (1834), emphasis added). 
Comity is as binding on courts as statutory law. As 
Justice Cardozo explained while still on the New York 
Court of Appeals in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New 
York, “[t]he misleading word ‘comity’ has been responsi-
ble for much *** trouble” by suggesting, wrongly, that 
courts have discretion to disregard international comity. 
224 N.Y. 99, 111 (1918). To the contrary, only the Legisla-
ture possesses such discretion. But Congress has done 
nothing to extend the civil subpoena power international-
ly. Nothing suggests Congress would sanction such pow-
er either, because of the pronounced friction the U.S.’s 
international discovery practices have provoked. “No as-
pect of the extension of the American legal system be-
yond the territorial frontier of the United States has giv-
en rise to so much friction” as broad U.S. discovery in 
international cases. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States § 442, Reporters’ 
Note 1 (1987). This is not just abstract theorizing. For-
eign nations and the European Commission itself have 
written to express their view that our civil data-collection 
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efforts are akin to foreign invasion: “a territorial en-
croachment without justification, one which is exacerbat-
ed by the sharp differences in the legal status of personal 
data in the U.S. and EU.” Albrecht C.A. Amicus Br. 10; 
see also Ireland C.A. Amicus Br. 7.  
Some countries have gone so far as to enact blocking 
statutes in direct response to U.S. courts’ exorbitant dis-
covery practices, Gary B. Born & Peter B. Rutledge, In-
ternational Civil Litigation in U.S. Courts 969–978 (5th 
ed. 2011). One such statute, Article 1A of French Penal 
Code Law No. 80-538, expressly prohibits turning over 
information absent a treaty or other international 
agreement, an obvious manifestation “of French dis-
pleasure with American pre-trial discovery procedures.” 
Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 508 (N.D. Ill. 
1984). And when the European Union’s General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) goes into effect in May, it 
will pose further barriers to enforcement of civil subpoe-
nas abroad, generally refusing to permit enforcement of 
a “judgment of a court *** requiring a [provider] to 
transfer or disclose personal data” unless the order is 
“based on an international agreement.” Commission 
Regulation 2016/679, art. 48, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 64. While 
the European Commission explains in its brief that there 
are derogations in the GDPR that could in some cases 
allow compliance with a unilateral U.S. warrant, those 
derogations are limited and apply only on a case-by-case 
basis. Indeed, just two weeks ago, the French Govern-
ment issued a statement declaring that the Govern-
ment’s position in this case risked a significant conflict 
with the GDPR. États-Unis – Union européenne - Q&R 
- Extrait du point de presse (Jan. 4, 2018), 
<https://goo.gl/ferJG8>. These strong international re-
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actions demonstrate that when it comes to international 
discovery and evidence gathering, the United States is 
resented as an outlier.  
Charming Betsy’s insight stems from the recognition 
that Congress is cognizant of these potential foreign-
affairs flare-ups, and normally seeks to avoid them, not 
stoke them. That assumption is only reinforced through 
the Senate’s ratification of MLATs whose whole reason 
for being is to respect the sovereignties of other coun-
tries and smooth international friction by setting terms 
under which the gathering of evidence abroad can be 
done consensually. To take Congress’s silence regarding 
international enforcement of civil subpoenas as approval 
of these internationally condemned practices flies in the 
face of Charming Betsy and its insights about Con-
gress’s approach to lawmaking. The subpoena analogy is 
therefore poor ground for the Government to build its 
case upon. 
To stress this unsound foundation still further, and 
enlarge this projection of U.S. power into the area of 
Section 2703 warrants is far worse, because warrants are 
much more significant intrusions nations’ sovereignty 
and the liberties of their citizens than subpoenas. Unlike 
civil subpoenas, warrants are a tool of criminal law en-
forcement. And unlike subpoenas, they are not restricted 
to searches of property belonging to companies that are 
subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts—implying that 
the subject of the subpoena has some U.S. connection. If 
the Government is correct, Section 2703 warrants would 
allow seizures of data from anywhere in the world, and 
because providers often keep such data near their cus-
tomers, Resp. Br. 7, that effectively empowers U.S. offi-
cials to investigate any foreign citizen. Allowing that re-
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sult will only produce additional friction. It will also like-
ly invite retaliation from other countries that will be 
tempted to seize our citizens’ data through providers like 
Microsoft located in their territories, and would likely do 
so without bothering to respecting our citizens’ constitu-
tional rights, which limit the power of our government, 
not theirs.  
In short, reading the Stored Communications Act in a 
way that reaches foreign-stored data guarantees the 
very clash with international law Charming Betsy 
sought to avoid. If Congress wishes to authorize such 
broad, unilateral law enforcement powers instead of en-
gaging in cooperative treaty solutions, so be it. But Con-
gress gets to make that decision. For courts to insert 
themselves into these sensitive and important foreign 
policy decisions is inappropriate. This Court should de-
cline the Government’s invitation to do so. 
II. Transnational seizures of private electronic data 
also exceed the SCA’s territorial boundaries. 
The Government’s analysis of the law of extraterrito-
riality does not disregard the doctrine outright—as it 
does with Charming Betsy. But it still refuses to fully 
engage in the “focus” analysis this Court demands to en-
sure purely domestic laws remain domestic, and are not 
applied extraterritorially. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 
2010. The Government frames the SCA’s warrant provi-
sions as focused only on “disclosure,” solely because Sec-
tion 2703 uses the term “disclosure.” And because the 
Government sees “disclosure” as occurring only in the 
United States, that legerdemain allows the Government 
to free itself from the SCA’s acknowledged territorial 
boundaries, authorizing it—along with state and local 
law-enforcement officials—to physically seize data from 
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anywhere in the world. But the Government misunder-
stands the focus analysis, and its narrow conception of 
Section 2703’s focus is unsupportable. Even if the Gov-
ernment is right that Section 2703’s focus is restricted to 
disclosure, seizing foreign citizens’ private emails located 
in foreign countries still cannot be ignored as the incon-
sequential byproduct of that disclosure. 
A. The Government’s effort to sanction the 
unilateral seizure of private emails of foreign 
citizens stored abroad impermissibly narrows the 
focus inquiry. 
The flaws in the Government’s focus analysis begin 
with its failure to recognize that the SCA is a product of 
its time. When Congress enacted the SCA in 1986, it did 
not “intend that the Act regulate activities conducted 
outside the territorial United States.” H.R. Rep. No. 99-
647, at 32–33 (1986). Its provisions regarding access to 
stored wire and electronic communications were “in-
tended to apply only to access within the territorial 
States.” Ibid. Back then, the ability to transmit and store 
electronic information abroad—a seamless process in 
today’s world of non-localized “cloud computing”—did 
not even exist. Pet. App. 14a. And federal criminal law-
enforcement was considered largely a domestic, rather 
than international, affair. See National Commission of 
Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Final Report 21 
(1971) (“[T]he issue of extraterritorial application of the 
federal criminal law is one which does not arise frequent-
ly.”). From this historical perspective, it must be assumed 
that Congress anticipated the SCA to apply only to the 
domestic storage of data—and purely domestic disclo-
sures of data. Indeed, that is the only explanation for 
Congress’s decision to allow state and local law enforce-
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ment to use the SCA. Congress could never have con-
ceived of, let alone authorized, retrievals of communica-
tions stored in foreign countries.  
The Government’s effort to prove otherwise strips 
Section 2703 of this larger historical context. At best, this 
effort is merely a guess about what Congress’s focus 
would have been, and the laws Congress would have en-
acted, if it could have anticipated the technological 
changes that would occur a generation later with the 
globalization of data—exactly the sort of “speculation” 
and “divining what Congress would have wanted” that 
the Court properly prohibits. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 261. 
At worst, the Government’s position is a transparent at-
tempt to change the focus analysis’s basic purpose, and 
unnaturally restrict the scope of conduct that might be 
deemed extraterritorial, simply so that it might evade 
the SCA’s domestic limits. But the focus analysis rein-
forced the territorial boundaries of purely domestic laws; 
it provides no means to evade them. Indeed, just as Mor-
rison demonstrates that the law of extraterritorially 
does not lose its bite simply upon encountering some 
domestic conduct, it surely is not so craven as to flinch 
before such transparent efforts to nullify the presump-
tion. 
The Government’s narrow view of what “disclosure” 
entails presents separate problems. Disclosure cannot be 
understood as solely the act of turning data over to the 
government viewed in isolation. Disclosure involves a 
whole series of steps—including the retrieval of the un-
derlying data from storage—that must be performed to 
effectuate the disclosure. Law-enforcement officials’ au-
thority to compel these actions comes exclusively from 
the SCA. Accordingly, that entire range of conduct is 
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properly viewed as within Congress’s “focus,” and is thus 
subject to the SCA’s acknowledged domestic limits.  
The Government’s contrary view that “disclosure” re-
fers only to the isolated act of turning data over to the 
government, simply because the term actually appears 
on the page in Section 2703, Gov’t Br. 22–23, is ultimately 
grounded on the focus analysis conducted in cases like 
Morrison and RJR Nabisco, Gov’t Br. 19–20. Certainly 
both of those cases restricted their analysis to the lan-
guage of specific statutory provisions. RJR Nabisco, 136 
S. Ct. 2101–2103; Morrison, 561 U.S. at 262–265. And the 
narrow, text-focused inquiry employed in Morrison and 
RJR Nabisco was not only permissible for the statutes at 
issue in those cases, but necessary to protect their terri-
torial limits. Such statutes subject private parties to lia-
bility, and may involve factual scenarios involving actors 
and conduct occurring in a variety of countries. Confin-
ing the focus of such statutes to their specific terms is 
essential to ensure that their territorial boundaries are 
respected, and that foreign nations, and foreign transac-
tions, are not subjected to liability without congressional 
approval.  
That said, there are clues right in the SCA’s text that 
Congress views “disclosure” entailing more than simply 
turning data over to the government. The Act recognizes 
that disclosure involves all the steps needed to compel 
the “execution of a search warrant” by the provider on 
the Government’s behalf, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(g), including 
the retrieval of the underlying data from “electronic 
storage,” id. § 2703(a). 
But even if these textual clues were absent, an exam-
ination of the SCA’s focus must consider the entire realm 
of conduct it authorizes. This is because the analysis re-
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quired for domestic statutes like the SCA, which convey 
power to public government officials, is necessarily more 
searching than a simple examination of the text, requir-
ing instead a consideration of the context in which that 
power will be exercised. And when a domestic statute 
authorizes governmental actors to undertake a particular 
sequence of conduct, the entire sequence of authorized 
conduct must be understood as within the statute’s focus, 
and confined to the statute’s territorial limits, even when 
some of that authority is necessarily implied. 
So it was in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 
U.S. 108 (2013). There the Court was tasked with decid-
ing whether the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28 U.S.C. § 
1350, a law with no “extraterritorial reach,” Kiobel, 569 
U.S. at 118, authorizes causes of action for violations of 
the law of nations occurring entirely within the territory 
of a foreign sovereign. That question could not be re-
solved from the ATS’s text alone, because the ATS is 
“strictly jurisdictional,” Kiobel, 166 U.S. at 116 (quoting 
Sosa v. Alvarez–Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 713 (2004)), con-
veying power to district courts to entertain claims. It 
does not “expressly provide any causes of action.” Ki-
obel, 569 U.S. at 115 (emphasis added). The Act is silent 
about whether it covered violations of the law of nations 
occurring abroad.  
Thus, the Court explained, a different kind of analy-
sis was necessary from cases like Morrison, which in-
volved a statute “regulating conduct,” Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 
116 (citing Aramco, 499 U.S. at 246, not one concerning 
“a question of jurisdiction” conveyed to a court. Ibid. (cit-
ing Morrison, 561 U.S. at 254). And, the Court ex-
plained, that difference demanded that it go well beyond 
deciding “what Congress has done” in the ATS itself, 
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ibid., since Congress did not address extraterritorial 
claims specifically. Rather, it required determining what 
“courts may do” with the authority Congress had con-
veyed to them through the jurisdiction provided by the 
ATS, ibid. The Court thus looked to the full range of 
“what courts may do” in applying the ATS to determine 
whether it was being applied extraterritorially—whether 
those things were specifically enumerated in the statute 
or not. 
Kiobel’s approach translates exactly to this case. De-
termining whether law-enforcement may undertake 
cross-border seizures under a Section 2703 warrant is 
less a question of what Congress itself has done—in the 
precise language of the statute—to regulate such 
searches, but what it authorizes those law-enforcement 
officials to do in the real world, and whether law-
enforcement officials have exercised that authority in a 
manner that exceeds the SCA’s territorial boundaries. 
And that broader, functional view of Congress’s focus is 
essential to ensure that government officials do not ex-
ceed the statutory authority Congress has conveyed to 
them. When, as here, a portion of that authorized con-
duct occurs abroad, it exceeds the power conveyed by 
Congress. 
B. The principles that drive extraterritoriality 
analysis support this broad reading of Section 
2703’s focus. 
That conclusion is only reinforced by the principles 
underlying the extraterritorially analysis. These princi-
ples “constrain courts,” Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 116, and 
ought to inform determinations of about the “focus” of 
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domestic statutes like the SCA just as they inform de-
terminations about whether those statutes are domestic.  
Those principles powerfully counsel in favor of taking 
a broad view of the SCA’s applicable focus in this case, to 
incorporate all conduct authorized in effectuating “dis-
closure.” That result will best avoid friction with other 
countries—and clashes between our laws and theirs—
and it will protect Congress’s prerogatives in lawmaking, 
so that domestic statutes like the SCA do not slip their 
territorial boundaries through extraterritorial applica-
tion. 
1. The Government’s approach invites clash-
es with foreign nations without congres-
sional authorization. 
The Court strains to avoid interpretations of “U.S. 
law that carr[y] foreign policy consequences not clearly 
intended” by Congress. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 116. And it is 
wary of interpreting statutes in ways that avoid produc-
ing “friction” with foreign countries, RJR Nabisco, 136 
S. Ct. at 2106–2108. But the Government’s reading of the 
SCA introduces just these kinds of unintended foreign-
policy consequences and friction with other nations. Is-
sues concerning the handling of foreign citizens’ personal 
data, and conducting law-enforcement actions abroad, 
will naturally arouse the suspicion of foreign sovereigns. 
Those issues arise here in an international environment 
already inflamed by this country’s aggressive stance on 
civil discovery. To feed those flames by extending that 
stance into the far more intrusive criminal context is a 
terrible idea. And allowing the Government to imple-
ment this policy without being forced to make its case to 
Congress why such intrusion is necessary will invite 
abuse and overreach, especially when the targets of 
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these law-enforcement activities will virtually always be 
foreign nationals who lack strong voices in our national 
government. That incentive toward overreach will in 
turn increase the risk of retaliation, potentially fostering 
an ever-escalating conflict. Consideration of these “ad-
verse foreign policy consequences” should leave the 
Court reluctant to rule in the Government’s favor. Ki-
obel, 569 U.S. at 124 (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727–728). 
Extending our warrant power to collect data stored 
abroad—thereby imposing our laws regarding the collec-
tion of data in other countries—will also produce direct 
clashes with other countries’ legal regimes. By law and 
by treaty, other countries have different rules for pro-
tecting digital property, and different rules for court-
compelled disclosure of information. Anthony J. Colan-
gelo, Absolute Conflicts of Law, 91 Ind. L. J. 719, 734–
735 (2016). In many such situations, compliance with one 
law will invariably lead to violation of the other. Ibid. (de-
scribing “procedural absolute conflicts of law” where 
“one state’s litigation-oriented discovery order compels 
production of information and another state’s litigation-
oriented law prevents the production of that infor-
mation”). That could put many American electronic ser-
vice providers like Microsoft in impossible situations, 
with potentially criminal consequences, when they do 
business abroad. And the only assurance that the Gov-
ernment offers to assuage these concerns—that such 
clashes have not happened yet—offers cold comfort, and 
contradicts concerns that Government itself has raised in 
other forums. Law Enforcement Access to Data Stored 
Across Borders: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on 
Crime and Terrorism (May 24, 2017), at 50:30–51:40, 
<goo.gl/T7Ai7u> (testimony of Brad Wiegmann, Deputy 
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Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice) (stating that 
“when U.S. authorities are seeking data overseas,” there 
is always least the “potential for conflicts”). Such poten-
tial regulatory nightmares strongly indicate that “if 
Congress intended such foreign application ‘it would 
have addressed the subject of conflicts with foreign laws 
and procedures’” itself, Morrison, 561 U.S. at 269 (quot-
ing Aramco, 499 U.S. at 256). 
Finally, if history is any guide, a ruling for the Gov-
ernment that sanctions unilateral international seizures 
under Section 2703 could have real-world consequences 
for ongoing international efforts to address these press-
ing issues and bring harmony to this area of internation-
al law, “a matter of increasing importance in an ever 
more interdependent world.” Sosa, 542 U.S. at 761 
(2004) (Breyer, J., concurring). In the past, when courts 
have rejected government arguments for extending do-
mestic statutes extraterritorially, those refusals have 
served as encouragement for the U.S. to engage in bilat-
eral or multilateral efforts to overcome these limitations. 
See Tonya Putnam, Courts Without Borders 6 (2016). A 
ruling for the Government will diminish any incentive for 
the U.S. to come to the bargaining table, and undermine 
the international forces working toward harmony.  
2. The Government’s approach undermines 
the separation of powers and shared as-
sumptions about Congress’s approach to 
lawmaking. 
Adopting the Government’s wooden approach to ex-
traterritoriality, and its narrow position on the SCA’s fo-
cus, will also put serious strain on the separation of pow-
ers, in ways that Congress is presumed to avoid in enact-
ing statutes. Requiring courts to authorize Section 2703 
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warrants allowing for the seizure of data physically lo-
cated in other countries would force them into disputes 
with other countries on extraordinarily sensitive foreign-
affairs issues. It would be odd indeed for Congress to as-
sign these issues to federal district courts, especially 
without equipping them with mechanisms to reduce that 
friction.  
And courts should not assume those responsibilities 
for themselves. These foreign-affairs issues properly be-
long to Congress, the branch that possesses the constitu-
tional authority to address foreign policy in lawmaking, 
which alone has the institutional capacity to craft the nu-
anced policies needed to navigate such dangerous wa-
ters. For courts to step in and bless unilateral executive 
action would displace Congress’s proper role. And it 
would disrupt the constitutionally mandated conversa-
tion between Congress and the Executive over how these 
issues ought to be handled, diminishing any incentive for 
the branches to engage in the heavy lifting needed to 
craft appropriate international and domestic policy solu-
tions. 
Congress likewise would never have allowed state 
and local officials to insert themselves into these delicate 
foreign-affairs issues. They are among the “governmen-
tal entities” that Congress permits to use Section 2703’s 
warrant provision. 18 U.S.C. § 2711(4). But they lack the 
competence, constitutional authority, and political ac-
countability to our national polity that Congress would 
certainly have demanded of anyone it had chosen to as-
sume such sensitive duties. 
The cacophony of different voices introduced under 
the Government’s interpretation also undermines the 
principle that the government must speak with “one 
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voice” in foreign affairs. Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cty. of Los 
Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 449 (1979). And it risks “impinging 
on the discretion of the Legislative and Executive 
Branches in managing foreign affairs.” Kiobal, 569 U.S. 
at 116 (internal quotation omitted). How could Congress 
promise to engage in consensual processes for handling 
data in negotiations with other countries, while at the 
same time authorizing other actors—those over which it 
has no direct control—to proceed unilaterally? More im-
portantly, why would Congress ever put itself into that 
untenable position in the first place? The Government 
cannot answer these concerns.  
Further, the Government’s narrow approach to extra-
territoriality also depends upon the idea that electronic 
incursions ought to count less—or not count at all—in 
the focus analysis. That seed should be allowed no room 
to spread, as it would undermine the basic bargain be-
tween Congress and the Court about how the laws Con-
gress enacts will be applied over time. When Congress 
enacts laws, it makes use of the Court’s cautious ap-
proach to extraterritoriality, and counts on the courts to 
maintain a consistent application of those doctrines over 
time. That allows Congress to legislate with confidence 
that those doctrines will protect the territorial limits of 
its laws, so unforeseen circumstances do not create unin-
tended international implications for purely domestic 
laws. Indeed, the enactment of the SCA is a perfect illus-
tration of this phenomenon. The Court’s extraterritorial-
ly doctrines are thus a hedge against the march of tech-
nological change and the expansion of global information 
networks, meant to halt extraterritorial creep at the 
border. They should not be interpreted to facilitate it. 
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If the Government’s approach to extraterritoriality 
became the law, it would mean that as the world changes 
and becomes even more globalized, Congress will have to 
periodically revise its own domestic laws simply to en-
sure that they remain domestic, and must devote re-
sources to anticipating and monitoring extraterritorial 
creep. That reverses the presumption against extraterri-
toriality, and forces Congress to do the work that it right-
ly counts on extraterritorial doctrine to do for it. For all 
these reasons, the Government’s narrow view of the ex-
traterritoriality analysis ought to be rejected. 
C. The Government’s concerns about protecting 
law-enforcement efficacy are best addressed to 
Congress. 
The Government raises concerns that enforcing Sec-
tion 2703’s domestic limits will hamper law enforcement. 
It worries that making the ability to obtain evidence in 
criminal investigations turn upon a “provider’s business 
decision” might invite abuse, Gov’t Br. 42. It also raises 
concerns that MLATs cannot provide a “reliable substi-
tute” for a Section 2703 warrant because too few such 
treaties exist, and proceeding through them can be a 
slow, cumbersome, and uncertain process. Id. at 44.  
Amici do not mean to minimize these concerns, but 
they are addressed to the wrong body. The Government 
provides nothing to suggest that Microsoft or any other 
provider moves data to deliberately interfere with legit-
imate law-enforcement objectives. Congress would cer-
tainly care if any provider did engage in such shenani-
gans. And if Section 2703 does not currently meet law 
enforcement needs, and unilateral seizures are truly 
necessary to properly investigate transnational crimes, 
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then the Government should explain to Congress why 
the statute ought to be amended. That would provide 
Congress its rightful opportunity to weigh the need for 
such reforms against the international friction they 
would inevitably foster. As Microsoft explains, this pro-
cess is already ongoing, and Congress has given every 
indication that it will take the Government’s legitimate 
concerns into account. Likewise, if MLATs do not yet 
provide a workable alternative, that should only spur the 
U.S. to further engage internationally, so that it might 
create more effective treaty solutions—and more of 
them—and to develop international standards that will 
address these difficult transnational problems as the 
world changes. 
* * * 
In a rapidly shrinking world, dramatic changes relat-
ed to transnational crime and data challenge traditional 
understandings about territorial regulation. The Gov-
ernment may ultimately convince Congress that the poli-
cy reasons supporting its position are stronger than the 
policy reasons supporting Microsoft’s. But these compli-
cated policy issues implicate important principles of in-
ternational law. Both the Charming Betsy canon and the 
law of extraterritoriality require that in such instances 
the Court not act, but allow Congress to act first. Push-
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